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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction from final agency action in formal
proceedings of the Labor Commission under the Administrative Procedures Act and Chapter 2a
of the Judicial Code. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46-b-16(l) & (2) (2004); 78-2a-3(2)(a) (2002).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The sole issue on appeal is whether the Labor Commission incorrectly interpreted Section
34A-3-110 of the Utah Code to mean that medical expenses are not "compensation" subject to
apportionment under that provision.
The standard of review for the Labor Commission's interpretation/application of a statute
is correction-of-error. Thomas v. Color Country Management, 2004 UT 12 ^ 9, 84 P.3d 1201;
Wood v. Labor Commission, 2005 UT App 490 \ 5, 128 P.3d 41, 43.
TEXT OF AUTHORITIES
1. "As used in this chapter: . . . (3) 'Compensation' means the payments and benefits
provided for in this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. Utah Code Ann. §
34A-2-102(3)(2005).
2.

The "Occupational disease aggravated by other diseases" provision is set forth

verbatim in the Addendum to this brief. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-110 (2005).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a. Nature of the Case.
This is a Petition for Review of the Order Affirming ALJ's Decision (hereinafter
''Decision") of the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission dated November 30, 2006
(R.68-70) insomuch as it affirms the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order

i

(hereinafter "Order") of the Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter "ALJ") dated September 6,
2006, (R.53-57) and denies the Motion for Review of Petitioners' herein dated October 5, 2006
(R.58-63).
b.

Course of Proceedings.

On August 11, 2005, Jeffrey D. Smith (hereinafter "claimant") filed an Application for
Hearing alternatively claiming industrial accident or occupational disease for a lower back
condition he claims arose from working "as a meat packer for many years [causing] cumulative
injury to [his] lower back from excessive bending and lifting of heavy meat." (R.l). Petitioners
herein, Dale T. Smith & Sons, Inc. and Workers Compensation Fund (hereinafter, collectively,
"WCF") answered the Application by generally denying that claimant's "low back condition was
caused by any work-related accident or exposures."1 (R. 16).
After discovery, the case proceeded to hearing on July 7, 2006. The parties stipulated
that the matter should be heard on a theory of occupational disease, not industrial accident. (R.
68 n.l). Also, claimant withdrew his claims for temporary total disability compensation and
permanent partial impairment compensation because those issues were resolved by stipulation of
the parties prior to the hearing. (R. 54).
On September 6, 2006, the ALJ entered the Order, which determined, inter aha, that
because the claim was only for medical expenses and because even WCF's medical evidence
showed that at least thirty-five percent (35%) of claimant's condition was attributable to
occupational exposures, WCF was liable for payment of all medical expenses because such

1

Claimant also joined Libeity Insuiance Corp., an eailiei woikeis compensation msiuance carriei for Dale T Smith
& Sons, as a lesponclent. At the heaiing, based upon stipulation of the paities, Liberty Insuiance Coip. was
dismissed as a pait) (R 53, 56) WCF now admits that it is solely liable foi claimant's occupational disease,
subject to apportionment foi non-employment causes of claimant's low back condition
2
Claimant nevei lost any work because of his condition so no tempoiaiy total disability was owed Based upon the
independent medical examination lepoit and addendum fiom Di Stephen Maible, WCF admitted liability foi
permanent paitial impaiiment compensation foi seven peicent (7%) of the whole peison

2

benefits are not "compensation" under the meaning of Section 34A-3-110 allowing for
apportionment of "compensation" against non-employment causes of claimant's condition. In
making this determination, the ALJ relied upon the recent Labor Commission Appeals Board
Order on Motion for Review in Edmonds v. Epixtech, Case No. 02-0969 (Appeals Board, August
29, 2006).3 (R. 55-56).
On October 5, 2006, WCF filed a Motion for Review before the Labor Commissioner,
contending that although the ALJ properly applied the holding of Edmonds, Edmonds was
wrongly decided and should be oveiruled.4 (R. 59-61). Claimant objected to the Motion for
Review on the grounds that the ALJ and Labor Commission has properly interpreted Section
34A-3-110 and requested that the matter be heard by the Appeals Board. Utah Code Ann. §
34A-1-303 (3) (2005). (R. 64-65).
c.

Disposition at Agency.

On November 30, 2006, the Labor Commission Appeals Board rejected WCF's
contention that Edmonds was wrongly decided and entered the Decision, consisting of two
pages. (R. 68-69).
d.

Statement of Facts.

Claimant was employed at Petitioner Dale T. Smith and Sons at an early age in 1978.
Dale T. Smith is claimant's grandfather, who founded the company as a family business.
Claimant worked initially cleaning corrals and the plant and then, at age 16 (1982), started
working part time as a meat cutter. After college, claimant began working full time as a meat

"' The Edmonds case is now also before this court on a Petition for Review. The case is styled, Ameritech, et al. v.
Labor Commission, et al., Case No. 20060870.
4
WCF also aigued that, because the apportionment was in dispute, that issue should have been refened to a medical
panel under both statutory and administrative provisions. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601 (2005); Utah Admin. Code
§ R602-2-2(A)(l) (2006). Since the Appeals Boaid rejected WCF's suggestion that the Labor Commission overrule
Edmonds, it did not reach this issue. If WCF prevails on this Petition for Review, then, on remand, the Appeals
Board will still need to consider whether the mattei should be referred to a medical panel.

cutter. This job required heavy lifting, bending, pushing and pulling of cattle quarters and more.
(R. 54).
In 1995, claimant began experiencing low back pain and sought treatment with a
chiropractor. Claimant periodically obtained chiropractic treatments and other conservative care
for his low back pain over the years. Then, in 2003, claimant saw Dr. Gordon Kimball, M.D.,
who ultimately referred claimant for an MRI, which disclosed an L5-S1 disk extrusion and
lumbar degenerative changes, all of which Dr. Kimball attributed to claimant's work activities at
Dale T. Smith & Sons. (R. 54, 74 [p. 12]).
During discovery, WCF obtained an independent medical examination from Dr. Stephen
Marble, M.D. In a report dated April 26, 2006, and an addendum thereto dated May 30, 2006,
Dr. Marble agreed that most of Smith's L5-S1 injury and some of Smith's lumbar degenerative
disease were attributable to Smith's work activities at Dale T. Smith and sons. In general, Dr.
Marble concluded that 35% of Smith's entire low back condition was related to Smith's work
activities and 65% non-employment causes and conditions. (R. 54-55, 74 [pp. 1-B to 1-C, 8-9]).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Labor Commission did not properly interpret Section 34A-3-110 of the Utah Code to
conclude that medical expenses are not "compensation" subject to apportionment, especially
when considering the plain language of the definition of "compensation" under Section 34A-2102(3). Moreover, in Edmonds, which it applied here, the Labor Commission improperly relied
upon the mle of statutory construction announced in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial
Commission, 597 P.2d 875 (Utah 1979) because the factual framework in Kennecott does not
exist here.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE APPEALS BOARD IMPROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT
MEDICAL EXPENSES ARE NOT "COMPENSATION"
SUBJECT TO APPORTIONMENT UNDER SECTION 34A-3110 OF THE UTAH CODE
In the Order, the ALJ specifically found that "medical benefits are not compensation
under Section 34A-3-110 and, therefore, not subject to apportionment." (R. 55). The ALJ relied
upon a recent Labor Commission Appeals Board decision in its Order on Motion for Review in
Edmonds v. Epixtech, Case No. 02-0969 (Appeals Board, August 29, 2006). Although WCF
does not fault the ALJ for following precedent, the Appeals Board inteipretation of
"compensation" under Section 34A-3-110 in Edmonds, which it reaffirmed in the Decision, is
misguided.
Section 34A-3-110 provides that "[t]he compensation payable under this chapter shall be
reduced and limited" by causes outside employment in the state of Utah. Utah Code Ann. §
34A-3-110 (2005) (emphasis added). Thus, the key question is whether medical expenses are
"compensation" within the meaning of Section 34A-3-110.
"Compensation" is a term of art that has been defined in the Utah Labor Code as follows:
"'Compensation' means the payments and benefits provided for in this chapter or Chapter 3,
Utah Occupational Disease Act." Id., § 34A-2-102(3). Since medical expenses are "benefits"
under the Occupational Disease Act {see Id., §§ 34A-2-418; 34A-3-102(2); 34A-3-107(2)), it
then follows that under the plain language of Section 34A-2-102(3)5, medical expenses are
"compensation" subject to apportionment under Section 34A-3-110. In addition, under the

^ When mterpieting a statute, the mterpieting agency oi couit must fust look at the plain language of the statute.
See, Thomas v Calm Countn Management, 2004 LT 12. 1j 9. 84 P 3d 1201, 1205.

Occupational Disease Act, the legislature explicitly provides that in cases of occupational
disease, an employer is liable to pay both medical and disability benefits and then in Subsection
(2) of the same provision, impliedly refers to both types of benefits together as "compensation."
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-104 (2005).
Although the Labor Commission previously applied the definition of compensation under
Section 34A-2-102(3) to determine that medical expenses were "compensation" to be
apportioned under Section 34A-3-110,6 the Appeals Board has now obviously retreated from
that standard and now relies on Ketmecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 597 P.2d 875
(Utah 1979) as its basis for overruling itself. Kennecott, however, is distinguishable.
In Kennecott, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted "compensation" within the more
narrow meaning of that tenn in the then statute of limitations. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99 (1953
version). The supreme court did not consider the more general meaning of "compensation"
under Section 34A-2-102(3).7 Had the supreme court adopted the more general definition of
"compensation" under the then version of Section 34A-2-102(3) , it would have rendered the
statute of limitations regarding indemnity benefits meaningless. In that regard, the supreme
court stated as follows:
[I]f the furnishing of or payment for medical expenses by the company, which
may continue indefinitely, were to extend the limitation in which a claim may
be filed until three years after the last payment of such medical expense, that
would completely nullify any effect to be given to Sec. 35-1-99, and thus
defeat the legislative intent and the purpose of that statute. That would be
contrary to a cardinal rule of statutory construction: that, if there is uncertainty
of doubt as to the meaning of statutes, they should be so interpreted and
implied as to give meaning in effect to both.
6

Miliigan v. Utah State Tax Commission, Order on Motion for Review, at 3, Case No. 00-0232. (Labor
Commissioner, April 3, 2002).
' Although Section 34A-2-102(3) was numbered differently as Section 35-1-44(6) in the Workers Compensation Act
and Section 35-2- 12(b) in the Occupational Disease Act when Kennecott was decided in 1979. the basic definition
has not changed.
8
Section 35-1-44.

fs

Kennecott Copper Corp., v. Industrial Commission, 597 P.2d 875, 877-78 (Utah 1979) (citing,
73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, § 253).
In the instant case, since no conflict is created by applying the more general definition of
"compensation" under Section 34A-2-102(3), the Labor Commission need not have reverted to
the rule of statutory instruction stated in Kennecott to resolve a conflict between statutes.
The narrow applicability of Kennecott is further illustrated in another Utah Supreme
Court case that determined that "compensation1' does include medical expenses. In Taylor v.
Industrial Commission, 743 P.2d 1183 (Utah 1987), a claimant sought a determination that
medical expenses were not "compensation" to which a claim for reimbursement and offset
against recovery in a Third Party action would be applied under the then version of Utah Code
Ann. § 34A-2-106 (2005). The supreme court upheld the ALJ and Labor Commission's holding
that within the meaning of Section 35-1-62 (the then version of Section 34A-2-106),
"compensation" did include medical expenses. Id., at 1185-86 (citing 2A A. Larsen, Workers'
Compensation Law § 74.33). Although Taylor did not directly consider the interpretation of
"compensation" found in Kennecott, it is obvious that the supreme court can and does apply
differing inteipretations depending upon the context of the statute. Here, as already stated, the
context of the statute requires the more general definition of compensation under Section 34A-2102(3).

CONCLUSION
Based upon the above discussion, this court should reverse the Decision of the Labor
Commission and remand the case for further proceedings before the Appeals Board and ALJ.
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ADDENDUM

Text of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-110

A

§ 34A-3-110. Occupational disease aggravated by other diseases

The compensation payable under this chapter shall be reduced and limited to the
proportion of the compensation that would be payable if the occupational disease
were the sole cause of disability or death, as the occupational disease as a causative
factor bears to all the causes of the disability or death when the occupational
disease, or any part of the disease:
(1) is causally related to employment with a non-Utah employer not subject to
commission jurisdiction;
(2) is of a character to which the employee may have had substantial exposure
outside of employment or to which the general public is commonly exposed;
(3) is aggravated by any other disease or infirmity not itself compensable; or
(4) when disability or death from any other cause not itself compensable is
aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any way contributed to by an occupational
disease.

Edmonds v. Epixtech
Labor Commission Appeals Board Decision,
August 29, 2006
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APPEALS BOARD
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
TAMARA M. EDMONDS,
Petitioner,
ORDER ON MOTION FOR
REVIEW

vs.
EPIXTECH,1 AMERICAN PROTECTION
SERVICES/KEMPERER and
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY,2

Case No. 02-0969

Respondents.

Tamara M. Edmonds requests review of Administrative Law Judge Marlowe's decision
regarding Ms. Edmonds claim for benefits under the Utah Occupational Disease Act ("the Act"; Title
34A, Chapter 3, Utah Code Annotated).
The Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for
review pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-12, § 34A-3-102(2) and § 34A-2-801(3).
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED
On September 3, 2002, Ms. Edmonds filed an occupational disease claim against Epixtech
alleging that the repetitive stress of her employment had caused carpal tunnel syndrome.3 Judge
Marlowe held an evidentiary hearing and then referred the medical aspects of Ms. Edmonds' claim to
a medical panel. The panel submitted its report on September 9, 2004. Ms. Edmonds and American
each filed objections to the report.
Judge Marlowe issued her decision on June 28, 2005. Because Ms. Edmonds had neither
missed work nor shown any pennanent disability from her carpal tunnel syndrome, Judge Marlowe
did not award any disability compensation to Ms. Edmonds. Regarding Ms. Edmonds' claim for
1 Ms. Edmonds' employer has been known as "Ameritech Library Sendees," "Dynix," and
"Epixtech." In this decision, the Appeals Board refers to the company as Epixtech, its name during
the last period of Ms. Edmonds' employment.
2 During Mrs. Edmonds' employment, Epixtech was insured by two different insurance earners:
Continental Casualty from January 1,1989, through December 31,1994; and American Protection
Services/Kemper from January 1,1995, through January 1, 2000. Reference in the caption of Judge
Marlowe's decision to Continental Casualty/Kemper is inconect and has been conected. American
Protection Services/Kemper is refened to as "American" in this decision.
3 Ms. Edmonds' application also alleged other conditions affecting her neck, back and arms.
These claims were later abandoned bv Ms. Edmonds.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW
TAMARA M. EDMONDS
PAGE 2
medical benefits, Judge Marlowe's decision addressed American's objection to the panel report, but
did not address Ms. Edmonds' objection. Judge Marlowe then adopted the panel's conclusion that
90% of Ms. Edmonds' caipal tunnel syndiome was cdUaul by non-woik uoiidiiions and 10% was
attributable to work-related aggravation of those non-work conditions. Judge Marlowe ordered
American to pay 10% of Ms. Edmonds' medical expenses.4
Ms. Edmonds now requests review of Judge Marlowe's decision on the grounds that: 1) the
decision does no I address Ms. Edmonds' objections to the medical panel report; and 2) the decision
improperly limits payment of Ms. Edmonds' medical expenses.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The underlying facts of Ms. Edmonds work and the nature of her occupational illness are not
in dispute. Instead, Ms. Edmonds' motion for review raises primarily procedural and legal questions.
The Appeals Board therefore adopts Judge Marlowe's findings of fact.
DISCUSSION
Ms. Edmonds' objection to medical panel. Subsection 34A-2-601(l)(b) of the Utah
Workers' Compensation Act authorizes ALJs to appoint medical panels to consider the medical
aspects of occupational disease claims. Subsection 601(2)(d)(ii) of the Act allows the parties to file
objections to medical panel reports. Ms. Edmonds filed such an objection to the panel report in this
case but Judge Marlowe did not address that objection. The Appeals Board will therefore consider
Ms. Edmonds' objection now.
Ms. Edmonds attacks the panel's attribution of 90% of her carpal tunnel syndrome to nonwork causes. The panel made this allocation based on its statement that carpal tunnel syndrome is
caused by certain non-work factors. Ms. Edmonds argues that, because she has none of the nonwork factors identified by the panel, it was illogical for the panel to conclude that 90% of her carpal
tunnel syndrome was caused by such non-work factors. The text of the medical panel's comment
regarding causes of carpal tunnel syndrome is as follows:
The primary risk factors leading to carpal tunnel syndrome in the general population
are non-industrial, and include age, anatomic factors, inherited tissue factors,
smoking status, endocrine problems, pregnancy, obesity, and inflammatory
conditions.
While it is true that not all of the foregoing factors apply to Ms. Edmonds, others do apply.
Specifically, anatomical and tissue factors that vary from individual to individual can cause carpal
4 American, rather than Continental, was ordered to pay Ms. Edmond's medical benefits because
American was the insurance carrier during the period of Ms. Edmonds' last exposure to carpal tunnel
syndrome at Epixtech. American has not contested its liahilitv

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW
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tunnel syndrome. Furthermore, the panel's enumeration of risk factors was illustrative rather than
exhaustive. Considering the report as a whole, with due regard for the panel's impartiality, expertise,
and familiarity with Ms. Edmonds' entire medical history, the Appeals Board accepts the panel's
conclusions.
Apportionment of medical benefits. Judge Marlowe concluded that Ms. Edmonds's medical
benefit should be limited to 10% of the cost of treatment, based on medical panel's finding that Ms.
Edmonds' work accounted for 10% of the cause of her carpal tunnel syndrome. Judge Marlowe does
not explain the basis for her conclusion. The Appeals Board therefore turns to the statutory
provisions of the Occupational Disease Act.
Section 34A-3-103 of the Occupational Disease Act defines a "compensable occupational
disease" as "any disease or illness that arises out of and in the course of employment and is medically
caused or aggravated by that employment."5 (Emphasis added.) The panel report establishes that
Ms. Edmonds' carpal tunnel syndrome was aggravated by her work at Epixtech. Consequently, Ms.
Edmonds' carpal tunnel syndrome is a "compensable occupational disease." As such, it triggers
Epixtech's liability under § 34A-3-104(l) of the Act:
Every employer is liable for the payment of disability and medical benefits to
every employee who becomes disabled, or death benefits to the dependents of any
employee who dies by reason of an occupational disease under the terms of this
chapter.
Ms. Edmonds has not shown that her carpal tunnel syndrome caused any disability, but she
has required medical care. The precise question before the Appeals Board is whether Ms. Edmonds'
right to payment of her medical expenses is subject to, and reduced by, § 34A-3-110 of the Act.6

5 In Cook v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 57 P. 3d 1084, 1087 (Utah 2002), the Utah Supreme Court
observed that, for purposes of the Occupational Disease Act, the word "aggravate" does not signify
causation, but means "to make worse, more serious, or more severe."
6

Section 34A-3-110, "Occupational Disease Aggravated By Other Diseases" provides as follows:
The compensation payable under this chapter shall be reduced and limited to the
proportion of the compensation that would be payable if the occupational disease
were the sole cause of disability or death, as the occupational disease as a causative
factor bears to all the causes of the disability or death when the occupational disease,
or any part of the disease:
(1) is causally related to employment with a non-Utah employer not subject to
commission jurisdiction;
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By its own terms, § 110 only applies to "compensation." Ms. Edmonds argues that this
precludes the use of § 110 to reduce medical benefits. However, American and Continental argue
that § 110's use of "compensation" should be interpreted as including disability compensation and
medical benefits, thereby making Ms. Edmonds' medical benefits subject to § 110's apportionment
formula.
hi considering the meaning of "compensation" as used in § 110, the Appeals Board notes that
§ 102(2) of the Occupational Disease Act provides that "[sjubject to the limitations provided in this
chapter, and unless otherwise noted, all provisions of Chapter 2, Workers' Compensation Act... are
incorporated into this chapter and shall be applied to occupational disease claims." Thus, in
considering the meaning of "compensation" for purposes of § 110 of the Occupational Disease Act,
the Appeals Board notes the definition provided by § 34A-2-102(3) of the Workers' Compensation
Act: "'Compensation' means the payments and benefits provided for in this chapter or Chapter 3,
Utah Occupational Disease Act."
The foregoing definition of "compensation" has been part of the Workers' Compensation Act
since at least 1943 and could be viewed as encompassing both disability compensation and medical
benefits. However, in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 597 P.2d 875 (Utah 1979),
the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the term "compensation" did not include medical benefits.
Because § 110 was enacted after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Kennecott, ibid., the
Appeals Board assumes that the Legislature intended the word "compensation" as used in § 110 to
have the meaning as was given in the Kennecott decision. The Appeals Board therefore concludes
that medical benefits do not fall within § 110's use of the term "compensation" and are not subject to
§110's apportionment formula.
The foregoing conclusion is consistent with the well-established principle that the Act must
be liberally construed in favor of payment of benefits. The conclusion is also supported by the fact
that the degree of apportionment under §110 depends upon the application of the ratio of workrelated disability and non-work disability, hi cases such as this, where there is no disability and only
medical benefits are due, § 110's apportionment formula would be impossible to apply.

(2) is of a character to which the employee may have had substantial exposure
outside of employment or to which the general public is commonly exposed;
(3) is aggravated by any other disease or infirmity not itself compensable; or
(4) when disability or death from any other cause not itself compensable is
aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any way contributed to by an occupational
disease.
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Summary. The Appeals Board has considered Ms. Edmonds' objection to the medical
panel's report, but for the reasons stated herein, accepts the medical panel's opinion. The Appeals
Board concludes that Ms. Edmonds' medical benefits are not subject to apportionment under § 34A3-110 of the Utah Occupational Disease Act.
ORDER
In light of the foregoing, the Appeals Board modifies the first paragraph of Judge Marlowe's
order, found at page 10 of her decision, as follows:
It is hereby ordered that respondents Epixtech and American Protection
Services /Kemper are liable for the reasonable expense of medical care necessary to
treat Tamara Edmonds' bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome.
The Appeals Board affirms the remaining portions of Judge Marlowe's decision. It is so
ordered.
Dated this gffi

day of August, 2006.

Colleen S. Colton, Chair

^atricia S. Drawe

mJLi
Jofedph E. Hatch
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the
court within 30 days of the date of this order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order On Motion For Review in the matter of Tamara
M. Edmonds, Case No. 02-0969, was mailed first class postage prepaid this £$ day of August,
2006, to the following:
Tamara M. Edmonds
633 N 1000E
MapletonUT 84664
Epixtech
400 W 5050 N
ProvoUT 84604
Uninsured Employers Fund
160E300S3rdFl
Salt Lake City UT 84114
Phillip Shell, Esq.
45 E Vine St
Murray UT 84107
Theodore Kanell, Esq.
136 E S Temple Ste 1700
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Bret M. Hanna, Esq.
170 S Main St Ste 1500
Salt Lake City UT 84101
Thomas Sturdy, Esq.
257 E 200 S Ste 800
Salt Lake City UT 84111

Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission

Milligan v. Utah State Tax Commission,
Labor Commissioner Decision,
April 30, 2002

r

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
MERICIA MILLIGAN,
Applicant,

ORDER ON MOTION
FOR REVIEW

v.
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION and
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND,

Case No. 00-0232

Defendants.

The Utah State Tax Commission and its workers compensation insurance carrier, the
Workers Compensation Fund (referred to jointly as "Tax Commission") asks the Utah Labor
Commission to review the Administrative Law Judge's award of benefits to Mericia Milligan under
the Utah Occupational Disease Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 3, Utah Code Ann.).
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to §34A3-102(2) of the Act, Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801 (3) and Utah Admin.
CodeR602-2-l.M.
ISSUES PRESENTED
The Tax Commission raises two issues for Commission review: 1) Should the medical panel
appointed by the ALJ in this matter be instructed to consider a specific medical research article
proffered by the Tax Commission; and 2) should the Tax Commission's liability for Mrs. Milligan's
medical expenses be limited to the proportion by which her work at the Tax Commission caused her
occupational disease.

BACKGROUND
Mrs. Milligan claims medical and disability compensation under the Utah Occupational
Disease Act for medical problems generally related to the overuse of her arms and hands. As
required by Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-601(l)(b), the ALJ referred the medical aspects of Mrs.
Milligan's claim to an independent medical panel for evaluation. The panel concluded that Mrs.
Milligan suffers from severe recurrent stenosing tenosynovitis in her arms and has incurred a 14%
whole person impairment from all causes. The medical panel attributed 80% of Mrs. Milligan's
disease to her work at the Tax Commission and 20% to nonwork activities.
After receiving the medical panel's report, the Tax Commission asked that the panel be
directed to review a particular medical research article addressing the relationship, or lack thereof,
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between computer use and carpal tunnel syndrome.1 The ALJ denied the Tax Commission's request
and adopted the medical panel's report as issued.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
Request for medical panel review of research article. The Commission affirms the ALTs
refusal to instruct the medical panel to consider a particular research article. The Commission and
its ALJs rely on medical panels because of their medical expertise. It is a panel's responsibility and
prerogative to determine the resources to be used in conducting its evaluation. Whether a panel has
properly discharged its function can be tested by contrary medical opinion and, in appropriate cases,
medical panel hearings. In this case, the Commission sees no need to intervene in the regular
processes of the medical panel system.
Apportionment of medical expenses. As already noted, Mrs. Milligan's medical problems
are caused 80% by her work at the Tax Commission and 20%) by personal non-work activities. The
Tax Commission contends that under these circumstances the plain language of §34A-3-l 10 of the
Occupational Disease Act limits the Tax Commission's liability for Mrs. Milligan's medical
expenses.
Section 34A-3-110 of the Occupational Disease Act provides as follows:
The compensation payable under this chapter shall be reduced and limited to
the proportion of the compensation that would be payable if the occupational disease
were the sole cause of disability or death, as the occupational disease as a causative
factor bears to all the causes of the disability or death when the occupational disease,
or any part of the disease:
(1) is causally related to employment with a non-Utah employer not subject
to commission jurisdiction;
(2) is of a character to which the employee may have had substantial exposure
outside of employment or to which the general public is commonly exposed;
(3) is aggravated by any other disease or infirmity not itself compensable; or
(4) when disability or death from any other cause not itself compensable is
aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any way contributed to by an occupational
disease.

'The Frequency of Carpal Tunnel Syndrome In Computer Users At A Medical Facility"
published in the medical journal Neurology on June 12, 2001.
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The Commission notes that the foregoing apportionment statute only applies to those claims
which meet one or more of the conditions described in subsections (1) through (4). The
circumstances of Mrs. Milligan's claim satisfy subsections (2), (3) and (4). Consequently, Mrs.
Milligan's claim is subject to the apportionment provisions of §34A-3-110.
Having determined that Mrs. Milligan's occupational disease claim is subject to §34A-3110's apportionment formula, the Commission must determine whether §34A-3-110's use of the term
"compensation" includes medical expenses. "Compensation" is defined by §34A-2-102(3) of the
Utah Workers' Compensation Act2 as "the payments and benefits provided for in this chapter or
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act." Section 34A-3-107(2) of the Occupational Disease Act,
in conjunction with §34A-2-418 of the Workers' Compensation Act, require payment of medical
expenses. It seems clear to the Commission that medical expenses are, therefore, both a "payment"
and a "benefit" so as to constitute a component of "compensation" which must be apportioned
pursuant to §343A-3-110.
In applying the apportionment formula of §34A-3-l 10 to Mrs. Milligan's medical expenses,
the Commission notes that 80% of Mrs. Milligan's medical problems, as identified in the medical
panel report, are caused by her work at the Tax Commission. The Tax Commission's liability for
payment of expenses for medical care necessary to treat such problems is therefore limited to 80%
of such expenses.
ORDER
The Commission hereby grants the Tax Commission's motion for review with respect to the
apportionment of Mrs. Milligan's medical expenses and amends paragraph five of the ALJ's
"Order," found at page 12 of the ALJ's decision, as follows:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents, State of Utah Tax Commission and
Workers Compensation Fund shall pay 80% of all medical expenses necessary to treat the
petitioner's occupational disease in accordance with the relative value schedule of the Labor
Commission, as outlined above. Such payments shall included interest at 8% per annum from the
date each charge was originally billed in accordance with Labor Commission rules.

2

Section 34A-3-102(2) of the Occupational Disease Act provides that "(s)ubject to the
limitations provided in this chapter and, unless otherwise noted, all provisions of Chapter 2,
Workers' Compensation Act, . . . are incorporated into this chapter and shall be applied to
occupational disease claims."
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Except as noted above, the Commission denies the remainder of the Tax Commission's
motion for review and affirms the other portions of the ALJ's decision. It is so ordered.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days
of the date of this order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of
Mericai Milligan, Case No. 2000232, was mailed first class postage prepaid this ja ^"day of
CMpNTH)T2002, to the following:
MERICIA MILLIGAN
587 E1550S
KAYSVILLE UT 84037
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
210 NORTH 1950 WEST
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84134
BARBARA SHARP
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND
P O BOX 57929
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84157-0929
MICHAEL BELNAP
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2610 WASHINGTON BLVD
OGDENUT 84401

Sara Danielson
Support Specialist
Utah Labor Commission

ah/mr/heading/00-0232
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
ADJUDICATION DIVISION
POBox 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
801-530-6800

JEFFREY D SMITH,
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER

vs.
DALE T SMITH AND SONS and/or
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND;
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP,
Respondent.

HEARING:

Case No. 05-0707
Judge Debbie L. Hann

Room 332 Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah,
. on July 7, 2006 at 8:30 AM. Said Hearing was pursuant to Order and
Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Debbie L. Hann, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The petitioner, Jeffrey D Smith, was present and represented by his/her
attorney Phillip Shell Esq.
The respondents, Dale T Smith and Sons and Workers Compensation
Fund, were represented by attorney Floyd Holm Esq. The respondents,
Dale T Smith and Sons and Liberty Insurance Corp were represented by
attorney Bret Gardner Esq.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The petitioner's Application for Hearing alleges entitlement to medical expenses, recommended
medical care, temporary total compensation and permanent partial compensation as the result of
a cumulative trauma injury and an occupational disease to the petitioner's low back. The
Commission issued a Notice of Formal Adjudicative Proceedings & Order for Answer on August
17, 2005. Both Answers denied the petitioner had suffered a compensable injury or occupational
disease.
Prior to the hearing, Liberty Insurance Corp, filed a motion to dismiss itself as a party to the
proceedings. This motion was granted at the hearing based upon the stipulation of the parties.
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At the hearing, the petitioner withdrew its claims for compensation as those issues had been
resolved leaving the medical claim as outstanding. The only issue remaining as to medical
expenses is the apportionment between industrial and non-industrial causes.

FINDINGS OF FACT
The petitioner is employed by the respondent, a family business. He began at age 12 after school
cleaning corrals and the plant. He began working part time as a meat cutter at age 16 and then
began working full time as a meat cutter when he joined the business full time following college.
Generally, this employment required the petitioner to regularly lift and manipulate quarters of
beef weighing 100-200 pounds, haul live cattle, including "downer" cows that required the
petitioner to prod, shock, push, pull, lift and twist to get these immobile cows into trailers The
petitioner is now age 40 and suffers from lumbar degenerative joint disease.
The petitioner sought treatment for low back pain in August 1995 and was diagnosed with
"sciatic neuralgia" by Dr. Egbert, a chiropractor. The petitioner sought treatment for low back
pain off and on with chiropractors over the years.
On September 22, 2003, the petitioner sought treatment with Dr. Kimball for, among other
things, low back pain. He was assessed with a lumbar sprain and an MRI was recommended.
Medical exhibit 15. The MRI was done on September 26, 2003 and revealed the L5-S1 disc
extrusion and lumbar degenerative changes but the petitioner did not get the results of this report
until February 2004. Medical exhibit 77-78, 14.
The petitioner told his father and uncles, the owners of Dale T. Smith and Sons, about his back
condition as the result of the heaving lifting at work. The petitioner reported back pain as the
result of heavy lifting to his family members over the years of working. The petitioner
characterized Dr. Kimball's report to him as having the back of "a 65 year old man" and when he
realized he had more than a temporary back strain, he reported his condition to his father and
uncles. The respondent, Dale T. Smith and Sons, filed a first report of injury in September 2004
after the petitioner expressed concern that his claim might not be covered for lack of notice.
The respondent, Dale T. Smith and Sons, received timely notice of the petitioner's claim.
Whether a first report was timely prepared by the employer is not within the control of the
employee who reported his industrial back condition, progressing from temporary strains to the
current claim of lumbar degenerative disc disease.
Dr. Kimball attributed the petitioner's L5-S1 ruptured disc and narrowing at L4-5 and L2-3 to
"years of rigorous work ex: lifting, turning, pulling." Medical exhibit 13.
Dr. Marble opined that 75% of the petitioner's L5-S1 condition was caused by his work activities
and that 25% of the other lumbar degenerative changes were caused by work activities.
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Medical exhibit 9. In a subsequent addendum to his original report, Dr. Marble apportioned 35%
of the petitioner's "entire overall low back condition" to his work activities and 75% to nonindustrial conditions. Dr. Marble assigned a 7% whole person impairment for the petitioner's
L5-S1 disk condition fully to the petitioner's work activities. Medical exibit 1-B.
The petitioner's employment activities with the respondent, Dale T. Smith and Sons, caused in
full or in part, the petitioner's degenerative lumbar disc disease.

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
A compensable occupational disease is "... any disease or illness that arises out of and in the
course of employment and is medically caused or aggravated by that employment." Utah Code
Ann. § 34A-3-103.
Utah Code § 34A-3-108(2) outlines the petitioner's reporting obligation for an occupational
disease:
(2) (a) Any employee who fails to notify the employee's employer or the division
within 180 days after the cause of action arises is barred from any claim of benefits
arising from the occupational disease.
(b) The cause of action is considered to arise on the date the employee first suffered
disability from the occupational disease and knew, or in the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have known, that the occupational disease was caused by employment.
Utah Code § 34A-3-110 outlines when "compensation" should be apportioned to account for
other non-compensable contributing causes. In Edmonds v. Epixtech et ah, Case No. 02-0969
(issued 8/29/06)1, the Commission Appeals Board ruled that medical benefits are not
compensation under § 34A-3-110 and therefore not subject to apportionment.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The petitioner suffered a compensable occupational disease, degenerative lumbar disc disease,
while employed by the respondent, Dale T. Smiths and Sons.
The respondent, Liberty Insurance Co., is dismissed as a party to this claim.

1

This case appears to overrule the holding in Milligan v. Utah State Tax Commission, Case No. 00-0232 (issued
4/30/02).

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
Jeffrey D Smith vs. Dale T Smith And Sons and/or Workers Compensation Fund; Liberty
Insurance Corp
Case No. 05-0707
Page 4

The respondents, Dale T. Smith and Sons and Workers Compensation Fund, are liable to the
petitioner for reasonable and necessary medical treatment for the petitioner's low back condition
pursuant to the Commission RBRVS fee schedule.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondents, Dale T. Smith and Sons and Workers
Compensation Fund, pay the petitioner for reasonable and necessary medical treatment for the
petitioner's low back condition pursuant to the Commission RBRVS fee schedule.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent, Liberty Insurance Co, is dismissed as a party
to this claim.
DATED September 6, 2006.

/~

Debbie L. Hann
Administrative Law Judge
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication Division
of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific basis for
review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this decision is
signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review within 20 days
of the date of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct the
foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order, was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on September 6, 2006, to the
persons/parties at the following addresses:

(\no
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Phillip Shell Esq
45 E Vine St
Murray UT 84107
Bret Gardner Esq
257 E 200 S Ste 800
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Floyd Holm Esq
392 E 6400 S
P O Box 57929
Salt Lake City UT 84107

UTAH-LABOR COMMISSION

Clerk, Adjudication Division
PO Box 146615
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615
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APPEALS BOARD
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
JEFFREY D. SMITH,

1

Petitioner,
vs.

ORDER AFFIRMING
ALJ'S DECISION

DALE T. SMITH & SONS and
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND,

Case No. 05-0707

Respondents.

Dale T. Smith & Sons and its insurance carrier, Workeis Compensation Fund (referred to
jointly as "Smith & Sons" hereafter), request review of Administrative Law Judge Hann's decision
awarding medical benefits to Jeffrey D. Smith under the Utah Occupational Disease Act ("the Act";
Title 34A, Chapter 3, Utah Code Annotated).
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §63-46b-12, §34A-2-801(3) and §34A-3-102.
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED
Jeffrey Smith seeks payment of medical expenses necessary to treat his degenerative low
back condition.1
Smith & Sons contends that Mr. Smith's low back condition should be
apportioned between work and non-work causes and that Smith & Son's liability for medical
expenses should be limited accordingly.
In her decision of September 6, 2006, Judge Hann denied Smith & Sons' request for
apportionment of Mr. Smith's medical expenses. In doing so, she relied on the Appeals Board's
decision in Tamara Edmonds v. Epixtech, et al. (Labor Commission Case No. 02-0969; issued
August 29, 2006), which held that medical expenses are not subject to the apportionment provisions
of §34A-3-l 10 of the Act. In seeking review of Judge Hann's decision, Smith & Sons argues that
Edmonds was wrongly decided.

l Initially, Mr. Smith originally filed alternative claims for medical benefits and disability
compensation under both the Utah Occupational Disease Act and the Utah Workers' Compensation
Act. Mr. Smith also named Liberty Insurance Corp. as a respondent. Liberty was later dismissed
from these proceedings and the remaining parties resolved Mr. Smith's claim for disability
compensation. Consequently, the only remaining issue is Mr. Smith's right to payment of medical
expenses. With the apparent consent of the parties, Judge Hann adjudicated that issue under the
provisions of the Utah Occupational Disease Act.
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DISCUSSION
In Edmonds the Appeals Board concluded that §34A-3-1 i O's use of the term "compensation"
for purposes of apportionment must be understood in light of the Utah Supreme Court's decision in
Kemiecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 597 P.2d 875 (Utah 1979), which held that
compensation did not include medical benefits. The Appeals Board further concluded that this
interpretation was supported by the principle that the Act must be liberally construed and the
impossibility of applying §34A-3-l 10's apportionment provision to medical-only claims.
Having visited this issue once again, the Appeals Board believes the reasoning followed in
Edmonds is correct. Under that reasoning, Mr. Smith's medical expenses are not subject to
apportionment under §34A-3-l 10.
ORDER
The Appeals Board affirms Judge Hann's decision. It is so ordered.
Dated this 'st) day of November, 2006.

Colleen S. Colton, Chair

Patricia S. Drawe

Josepl^E. Hatch

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the
court within 30 days of the date of this order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Affirming ALJ's Decision in the matter of Jeffrey
D. Smith, Case No. 05-0707, was mailed first class postage prepaid this ?>() "day of November,
2006, to the following:
Jeffrey D. Smith
655 E 12500S
Draper UT 84020
Dale T. Smith & Sons
12450 Pony Express
Draper UT 84020
Liberty Insurance Corp
175 Berkeley St
Boston MA 02117
Floyd Holm, Esq.
Workers Compensation Fund
392 E 6400 S
Salt Lake City UT 84107
Phillip Shell, Esq.
45 E Vine St
Murray UT 84107
Bret Gardner, Esq.
257 E 200 S Ste 800
Salt Lake City UT 84111

MM

NMiMk

Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission

